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Judging is an exercise of personal and institutional
character. It is a delicate mixture of logic tempered by
wisdom, reflection, imagination, and as much detachment
as a trained mind can achieve . . . . [J]udging requires a
tense engagement between the competing arguments in a
case—an honest statement of the most powerful theories
underlying each side’s view.
The Court’s role as
1
interpreter of our most basic law demands no less.
I.

INTRODUCTION

It is easy to become disheartened and cynical about the
judiciary when reading Lazarus’s description of the inner workings
of the Court in Closed Chambers: The Rise, Fall, and Future of the
Modern Supreme Court. Unlike his vision of what he thinks the
United States Supreme Court should be, Professor Edward Lazarus
describes the actual Court as a flawed, dysfunctional body, where
the Justices decide the most controversial (and arguably most

† Ann L. Iijima is a Professor of Law at William Mitchell College of Law.
She thanks Malinda Schmiechen for her research assistance and insights. This
article has been adapted from MINN. STATE LAW LIBRARY, The Judicial Career of Esther
M. Tomljanovich, in 14 MINN. JUSTICES SERIES (Barbara Golden & Anna M. Cherry
eds.) (forthcoming Sept. 2005) with the permission of the Minnesota State Law
Library.
1. EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE RISE, FALL, AND FUTURE OF THE
MODERN SUPREME COURT 286 (Penguin Books 1999) (1998).
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important) issues based on their personal predilections, and where
the rule of law is determined by a mere majority vote. Lazarus
observes that “[d]eep cynics in legal academia make fun of the idea
that there is more to lawmaking and judging than the exercise of
2
power.”
After reading the opinions of Justice Esther Tomljanovich,
even legal cynics may regain their faith in the judicial process and
their belief that our courts, both state and federal, can aspire to
Lazarus’s alternative vision.
A number of themes appear on a recurring basis in Justice
Tomljanovich’s opinions: an effort to balance the interests of
society in both individual freedom and public order; a preference
for deciding cases on narrow, clearly defined bases rather than
announcing broad constitutional principles; a belief in the
separation of powers; the protection of privacy rights, particularly
those involving the sanctity of the home; a reluctance to engage in
results-oriented decision-making, preferring instead to promote
and trust in a well-functioning legal system; and the use of logic
and common sense.
These themes may reflect an unusual breadth and depth of
experience. Her small-town upbringing in northern Minnesota
may have grounded her in the everyday lives and needs of working
people. Her struggles as a woman working her way through maledominated professions may have reinforced an inherent inclination
to take a relatively temperate approach to legal issues. Her
experiences with the legislature as the Revisor of Statutes and as a
trial and appellate judge may have increased her understanding of
both the roles and the limits of those institutions.
II. CRIMINAL CASES
Justice Tomljanovich’s opinions in criminal cases are
illustrative, particularly in her dissenting opinions, where she was
empowered to voice her thoughts free of majority-garnering
compromise.
One such dissenting opinion involved the infamous defendant,
Dennis Darol Linehan, who committed numerous rapes and sexual
3
assaults—kidnapping and killing one of his victims. After serving

2.
3.

Id.
In re Linehan, 557 N.W.2d 171 (Minn. 1996).
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his sentence, Linehan was committed indefinitely to state treatment
facilities under the Sexually Dangerous Persons (SDP) Act, a civil
4
commitment statute.
It was clear in which direction the arrow of political
expediency pointed. In a special legislative session just before the
statewide primary elections, the Minnesota House and Senate both
5
passed the SDP Act by unanimous votes. The district court, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals, and the Minnesota Supreme Court all
6
upheld the constitutionality of the SDP Act.
Justice Tomljanovich dissented, chiding the majority for
“shirk[ing] its duty to uphold appellant’s right to substantive due
7
process . . . .” She quoted from Justice Kennedy’s concurring
opinion in Texas v. Johnson, the flag-burning case:
“The case before us illustrates better than most that the
judicial power is often difficult in its exercise . . . . The
hard fact is that sometimes we must make decisions we do
not like. We make them because they are right, right in
the sense that the law and the Constitution, as we see
8
them, compel the result.”
By affirming the trial court’s civil commitment of
Dennis Darol Linehan . . . , this court today chooses to
make the easy decision. Not because it is right, not
because it is compelled by the constitutions of either the
United States or Minnesota, but because it is convenient
. . . . And what is the basis upon which the majority
reaches this conclusion? It is the fear of Dennis Darol

4. Id. at 174-76 (Minn. 1996), vacated sub nom. Linehan v. Minnesota, 522
U.S. 1011 (1997), remanded to 594 N.W.2d 867 (Minn. 1999) (on remand for
consideration in light of Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997)). On remand,
the Minnesota Supreme Court again held that the SDP Act did not violate
substantive due process. In re Linehan, 594 N.W.2d 867, 878 (Minn. 1999). Three
Justices disagreed, not including Justice Tomljanovich, who had retired the
previous year. See id. at 878-85 (Page, J., dissenting); id. at 885-87 (Lancaster, J.,
concurring and dissenting in part, joined by Anderson, J.).
5. In re Linehan, 557 N.W.2d at 198 (Tomljanovich, J., dissenting).
6. Id. at 174-75 (majority opinion).
7. Id. at 192 (Tomljanovich, J., dissenting). Justice Page joined Justice
Tomljanovich’s dissenting opinion and also wrote his own dissent. Id. at 206. He
noted that the sentence Linehan received was not sufficiently severe and that,
although the constitution would have allowed a sentence of life in prison without
the possibility of release, it did not allow preventive detention. Id. at 200 (Page, J.,
dissenting).
8. Id. at 191 (Tomljanovich, J., dissenting) (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397, 420-21 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
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9

Linehan and what he might do upon his release.
She concluded that “the Due Process Clause of the Constitution
prohibits us as a society from locking up persons simply because we
fear them . . . even if the future bad acts are almost certain to
10
occur.”
11
In State v. Paul, Justice Tomljanovich’s reading of the
Constitution again required her to take an unpopular position. In
Paul, the majority held that a police “officer in hot pursuit of a
person suspected of . . . driving under the influence of alcohol may
12
In her
make a warrantless entry into the suspect’s home.”
dissenting opinion, Justice Tomljanovich acknowledged the
important interests of the state in protecting public safety. “I
believe, as do the majority of thinking people, that drunk driving is
a very serious offense. I agree that drunk drivers should be
removed from the public highways because their actions are
13
intolerable.” She reasoned, however, that Paul’s privacy interests
outweighed the interests of the State. “If there is any place in the
world we should feel secure and have an expectation of privacy, it is
in our own homes. Today, the majority has made us less secure in
14
those homes without enhancing public safety.” She refused to
expand the previously recognized exceptions to the warrant
15
requirement.
9. Id. at 191-92 (Tomljanovich, J., dissenting).
10. Id. at 195.
11. 548 N.W.2d 260 (Minn. 1996).
12. Id. at 267.
13. Id. at 268.
14. Id.
15. Another example of this reluctance is seen in Justice Tomljanovich’s
majority opinion in State v. Varnado, 582 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 1998). In Varnado,
she refused to extend any of the “well-established exceptions to the Fourth
Amendment’s search warrant requirement” to allow police to search a person
suspected of a minor traffic violation before placing the person in the back of the
squad car. Id. at 887.
Under the state’s proposed rule . . . no articulable suspicion would be
necessary for a frisk. Any stop for a minor traffic violation when the
driver does not have a driver’s license . . . would ultimately provide
sufficient cause for a frisk because an officer would merely have to
request that a stopped person wait in the squad car during the license
check. Such a procedure would essentially eliminate any Fourth
Amendment protection against unreasonable searches in traffic stops.
Nonetheless, we agree that officer safety is a paramount interest and that
when an officer has a valid reasonable basis for placing a lawfully stopped
citizen in a squad car, a frisk will often be appropriate without additional
individual articulable suspicion.
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[E]ven with hot pursuit and exigent circumstances a
warrantless entry into a home for a misdemeanor offense
is unreasonable . . . . Our laws have provided for limited
entry under warrant, consent, emergency or exigent
circumstances when a felony is involved. We should not
stretch that limitation to break the promise of the
constitutional rights of our citizens to be secure in their
16
homes.
Justice Tomljanovich’s dissent also raised the separation of
powers issue. It emphasized that our system of justice requires both
the executive and judicial departments to fulfill their roles.
The framers of the Fourth Amendment incorporated the
warrant requirement into it, “reflecting their conviction
that the decision to enter a dwelling should not rest with
the officer in the field, but rather with a detached, and
disinterested Magistrate.” What the majority does today is
allow an officer in the field to make the determination for
warrantless entry into a private dwelling. It is here that I
disagree. The majority would impugn the intelligence of
our police officers by telling us that the officers cannot
know whether an offense is a felony or misdemeanor
before entering a home. Police officers know the law;
they know whether they have a felony or misdemeanor on
17
their hands.
Justice Tomljanovich seemed particularly protective of the
rights of criminal defendants where, as in Paul, the government’s
actions implicated privacy rights as well as Fourth Amendment
rights.
“The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all
the forces of the Crown. It may be frail; its roof may
shake; the wind may blow through it; the storm may enter;
the rain may enter; but the King of England cannot
enter—all his forces dares not cross the threshold of the
ruined tenement!”
Our forefathers believed as
passionately in the sanctity of the home as do I. They
drafted the Fourth Amendment to deny federal law
enforcement such intrusive entry and the Fourteenth
Amendment extended that restriction to state law
enforcement personnel as well. Our own Minnesota

Id. at 891.
16. 548 N.W.2d at 268-69 (Tomljanovich, J., dissenting).
17. Id. at 269 (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 582 n.17 (1980)).
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Constitution echoes those same tenets and we should not
18
now decide that the Crown may enter with the storm!
19
State v. Wynne also implicated both Fourth Amendment and
privacy issues. In Wynne, the police executed a warrant to search
Joy Pamela Wynne’s residence, her person, and any other person
20
located at her residence. Joy’s daughter, Andrea Wynne, drove up
21
Police officers took Andrea
while the search was in progress.
22
Wynne’s purse from her and escorted her into the house. They
found controlled substances in her purse and charged her with
23
felony possession.
Justice Tomljanovich’s majority opinion held that the search
24
was unconstitutional. The opinion carefully parsed through a
number of exceptions to the warrant requirement, finding that
25
none justified the search of the defendant’s purse. It leavened a
thorough examination of precedent with a liberal dose of logic and
common sense. Discussing whether the search fell within the
26
Terry doctrine, it stated:
When Andrea Wynne arrived at her home, officers met
her at the car in which she arrived, determined that she
was an occupant of the premises being searched, took her
purse and walked her and separately her purse, into the
house. First, we fail to understand how the purse
remained a threat to officers when it had been taken away
from its owner. Second, even if we accepted that the
purse did remain a threat because Andrea Wynne could
somehow have retrieved it from officers inside the house,
it was a threat that the officers themselves created by
bringing the purse inside the house. The officers then
went about remedying the self-generated dangerous

18. Paul, 548 N.W.2d at 269-70 (Tomljanovich, J., dissenting) (quoting Miller
v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307 (1958) (citing William Pitt, Earl of Chatham,
Address to the House of Commons in England (1763))).
19. 552 N.W.2d 218 (Minn. 1996).
20. Id. at 219.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 221.
25. Id. at 221-22.
26. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (holding that when a police officer
reasonably believes a suspect might be engaged in criminal activity and reasonably
believes that suspect might be armed, the officer is entitled to conduct a limited
search of the suspect’s outer clothing for weapons).
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27

situation by invading Andrea Wynne’s privacy.
Justice Tomljanovich acknowledged the realities of the duties
of police officers, but again rested her analysis upon the respective
roles of the executive and judicial branches.
We understand that in the excitement, and oftentimes the
danger of a drug search, the officers do not have time to
reflect on the parameters of Terry. We, however, do have
that luxury. We have a duty to the citizens and to law
enforcement officers to analyze the law carefully and set
out clearly the limits of a search. In our experience law
enforcement officers are not anxious to exceed the law,
and for that reason we need to carefully define the limits
28
of a search warrant.
29
In State v. Carter, Justice Tomljanovich’s majority opinion held
that the right to privacy in the home encompassed persons visiting
30
for commercial (albeit illegal) purposes. In Carter, the defendant
31
A police
was bagging cocaine in another person’s apartment.
officer, acting on a tip, observed this activity after he “left the
sidewalk, walked across the grass, climbed over the bushes, placed
his face within 12 to 18 inches of the window and peered
32
through a small gap between the
blinds . . . .”
Justice
Tomljanovich’s opinion held that the police officer had violated
33
the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.
Although Justice Tomljanovich’s opinion relied on the
defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy, it also considered
the case’s ramifications on the privacy rights of home owners.
“Although society does not recognize as valuable the task of
bagging cocaine, we conclude that society does recognize as
valuable the right of property owners or leaseholders to invite
persons into the privacy of their homes to conduct a common task,
34
be it legal or illegal activity.” She pointed out that “conduct that
would constitute an illegal search does not become something less
merely because the police had reasonable suspicion and embarked
on a search of limited intrusiveness. As such, we once again reject
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Wynne, 552 N.W.2d at 222.
Id.
569 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1997), rev’d, 525 U.S. 83 (1998).
Id. at 176.
Id. at 171.
Id. at 178.
Id. at 171.
Id. at 176.
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the notion that a little bit of information justifies a little bit of a
35
search.” The United States Supreme Court reversed this decision,
holding that Carter, only there for a short period for business
36
purposes, did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy.
37
State v. Dickerson also implicated both privacy and Fourth
Amendment rights. Justice Tomljanovich’s majority opinion again
refused to expand an exception to the warrant requirement.
Under the Terry doctrine,
police may stop and frisk a person when (1) they have a
reasonable, articulable suspicion that a suspect might be
engaged in criminal activity and (2) the officer reasonably
believes the suspect might be armed and dangerous. If
both of those factors are present, police may “conduct a
carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such
person[] in an attempt to discover weapons which might
38
be used to assault him.”
Justice Tomljanovich’s opinion refused to extend this “plain view”
exception to the “plain feel” of an object that could not conceivably
be a weapon, in this case, a marble-sized lump of crack cocaine.
Because we do not believe the senses of sight and touch
are equivalent, we decline to extend the plain view
doctrine to the sense of touch. We reach this conclusion
for two primary reasons. First, the sense of touch is
inherently less immediate and less reliable than the sense
of sight . . . . But even more important, the sense of touch
is far more intrusive into the personal privacy that is at
the core of the fourth amendment . . . . Observing
something that is held out to plain view is not a search at
all. Physically touching a person cannot be considered
39
anything but a search.
As in many of her opinions, Justice Tomljanovich’s opinion in
Dickerson demonstrated her use of common sense. In Dickerson, she
rejected the police officer’s testimony that he immediately
identified a lump of crack cocaine by touch.
The officer’s “immediate” perception is especially
remarkable because this lump weighed 0.2 grams and was
no bigger than a marble. We are led to surmise that the
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 178-79.
Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 91 (1998).
481 N.W.2d 840 (Minn. 1992), aff’d, 508 U.S. 366 (1993).
Id. at 843 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)).
Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d at 845 (citations omitted).
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officer’s sense of touch must compare with that of the
fabled princess who couldn’t sleep when a pea was hidden
beneath her pile of mattresses. But a close examination of
the record reveals that like the precocious princess, the
officer’s “immediate” discovery in this case is fiction, not
40
fact.
The United States Supreme Court disagreed with the
reasoning in Justice Tomljanovich’s opinion, holding that “police
officers may seize nonthreatening contraband detected during a
41
It
protective patdown search of the sort permitted by Terry.”
affirmed the judgment, however, because the officer’s search of
42
Dickerson had gone beyond what Terry allowed.
43
In re Welfare of R.A.V., the well-known cross-burning case,
required Justice Tomljanovich to balance two interests in which she
firmly believed—constitutional protection of the right of free
expression and jurisprudential principles constraining the court
from running roughshod over the acts of the legislature. In R.A.V.,
a Saint Paul ordinance provided that
[w]hoever places on public or private property a symbol,
object, appellation, characterization or graffiti, including
but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which
one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses
anger, alarm, or resentment in others on the basis of race,
color, creed, religion, or gender commits disorderly
44
conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
Justice Tomljanovich’s opinion observed that “[a]lthough the . . .
45
ordinance should have been more carefully drafted,” the court
was able to uphold it by following long-standing constitutional
40. Id. at 844.
41. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373 (1993).
42. Id. at 379. “If a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect’s outer clothing
and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately
apparent, there has been no invasion of the suspect’s privacy beyond that already
authorized by the officer’s search for weapons . . . .” Id. at 375. Here, however,
the officer was able to identify the contraband only after “‘squeezing, sliding and
otherwise manipulating the contents of the defendant’s pocket.’” Id. at 378
(citation omitted).
Honoring function over form, Justice Tomljanovich
categorizes Dickerson with the opinions reversed by the United States Supreme
Court. E-mail from Justice Esther Tomljanovich to Ann Iijima, Professor of Law,
William Mitchell College of Law (Nov. 21, 2003, 12:44 CST) (on file with author).
43. 464 N.W.2d 507 (Minn. 1991), rev’d sub nom R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505
U.S. 377 (1992).
44. Id. at 508.
45. Id. at 511.
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46

principles. “When possible . . . this court narrowly construes a law
subject to facial overbreadth attack so as to limit its scope to
conduct that falls outside first amendment protection while clearly
prohibiting its application to constitutionally protected
47
expression.” Accordingly, the court upheld the ordinance after
narrowing its scope to apply only to “fighting words,” that is,
expression that is “directed to inciting or producing imminent
48
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”
In reversing this decision, the United States Supreme Court
had to devise a new general principle. For the half-century leading
up to R.A.V., the Court consistently held that fighting words did
49
not constitute protected speech. In R.A.V., however, the Court
modified this principle and held that a narrowly-tailored, but
content-based restriction on fighting words would violate the First
50
Amendment.
51
Once again, in State v. Holmes, Justice Tomljanovich’s opinion
refused to expand the exceptions to the warrant requirement—in
that case, the exception for inventory searches. A University of
Minnesota parking monitor discovered that an illegally parked
52
vehicle had five unpaid parking tickets. She ordered the vehicle
53
to be towed.
When Holmes returned to his car, the parking
monitor felt intimidated and called the University police
department for assistance, despite the fact that Holmes had been
54
respectful and cooperative.
The officer asked Holmes for
identification and patted him down, finding a weapon’s magazine
55
clip. Although the parking monitor had already looked into the
vehicle to inventory any items, the officer searched the vehicle
again, finding an empty gun case on the floor and a handgun in

46. Id. at 509.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 510 (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969)).
49. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
50. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 377 (1992). This was not the only
case in which the United States Supreme Court contrived a new legal principle in
response to Justice Tomljanovich’s opinions. See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S.
366 (1993) (affirming Dickerson but adopting “plain feel” exception to warrant
requirement). See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
51. 569 N.W.2d 181 (Minn. 1997).
52. Id. at 182.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 183.
55. Id.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol32/iss1/6

10

Iijima: The Jurisprudence of Justice Esther Tomljanovich: Balancing the S
13IIJIMA_PAGINATED.DOC

2005]

11/17/2005 10:05:48 AM

JUSTICE ESTHER TOMLJANOVICH

445

56

the glove compartment. Holmes apparently admitted that the
57
handgun was his and that he did not have a permit to carry it. He
58
was charged with unlawful possession of a pistol.
In her majority opinion, Justice Tomljanovich, writing for a
unanimous court, held that the trial court had not erred in
suppressing the pistol and the defendant’s statements, articulating
59
the criteria for a valid inventory search. She confirmed that the
police may make a warrantless search of an impounded vehicle in
60
order to inventory the items. She stated, however, that there are
61
limits to this exception. The court will find such a search to
constitute “a reasonable inventory search only if police followed
standard procedures in conducting the search, and only if police
conducted the search, at least in part, for the purpose of obtaining
62
an inventory.” She noted that “searches conducted ‘in bad faith
or for the sole purpose of investigation,’ are not otherwise valid as
63
inventory searches.”
She acknowledged that making that
determination might be difficult, but “suggested that faith is ‘bad’
and investigative purpose ‘sole’ only when an inventory search that
64
otherwise would not have occurred is brought about.” Because
the search had been for the purpose of finding the pistol, it was not
a valid inventory search and did not fall within that exception to
65
the warrant requirement.
Although often protective of the constitutional rights of
criminal defendants, Justice Tomljanovich’s positions were based
firmly on the Constitution, rather than on any particular prodefendant sympathies. Her opinions permitted police officers to
perform their jobs effectively while they protected the procedural
and substantive rights of the accused. In a number of cases, her
opinions upheld the state’s actions against even arguably
sympathetic defendants.
66
For example, in State v. Pike, Justice Tomljanovich’s opinion

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id.
Id. at 184.
Id.
Id. at 185-86.
Id. at 186.
Id. at 187.
Id. at 188.
Id. (quoting Colorado v. Bertine, U.S. 367, 372 (1987)).
Id.
Id. at 188-89.
551 N.W.2d 919 (Minn. 1996).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2005

11

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 1 [2005], Art. 6
13IIJIMA_PAGINATED.DOC

446

11/17/2005 10:05:48 AM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:1

held that the State had “clearly and unequivocally” proven that the
trial court erred in dismissing gross misdemeanor charges against a
67
defendant.
The police officer claimed to have stopped Pike’s
vehicle because it was driving slowly, its owner’s license had been
68
suspended, and the driver matched the owner’s description. The
district court, not believing that the officer based his stop on the
vehicle’s speed or that the officer had been able to see the driver,
dismissed the case, finding that the stop had been “the product of
69
mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity.”
Justice Tomljanovich’s
opinion stated that, although warrantless searches are generally per
se unreasonable, a “limited investigative stop is lawful if the state
can show the officer to have had a ‘particularized and objective
basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal
70
It observed that, even if two of the officer’s three
activity.’”
rationales for stopping the defendant were disregarded, the
remaining rationale provided sufficient justification:
We hold that it is not unconstitutional for an officer to
make a brief, investigatory, Terry-type stop of a vehicle if
the officer knows that the owner of the vehicle has a
revoked license so long as the officer remains unaware of
any facts which would render unreasonable an assumption
71
that the owner is driving the vehicle.
As was her preference, Justice Tomljanovich’s opinion set out a
clear rule for police officers and reviewing courts.
Justice Tomljanovich believed in the ability of a properly
functioning legal system to produce justice. Accordingly, her
decisions often focused on maintaining the proper balance
between the branches of government and on ensuring the proper
role of judges and attorneys.
72
In State v. Krotzer, Krotzer, a nineteen-year-old man, had
consensual sexual intercourse with his fourteen-year-old
73
girlfriend.
After failing to reach a plea agreement with the
74
prosecutor, Krotzer pleaded guilty to statutory rape. The district
court did not accept the plea agreement and, instead, granted
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 921-22.
Id. at 921.
Id.
Id. (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981)).
Id. at 922.
548 N.W.2d 252 (Minn. 1996).
Id. at 253.
Id.
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Krotzer’s request to stay adjudication of the charge.
It placed
Krotzer on probation and ordered him to serve sixty days in jail and
76
to pay fines, fees, and surcharges. The district court apparently
overrode the prosecutor’s decision to try Krotzer for a felony
because of extenuating circumstances: Krotzer and his girlfriend
were no longer engaging in sexual relations, the girl and her
mother did not want to have Krotzer prosecuted, and Krotzer
would have had to register as a sex offender, despite the lack of a
77
history of aggressiveness.
Justice Tomljanovich’s dissent emphasized the separation of
powers issue. “Our system of government works because each of
the three branches respects the authority of the other—even when
we think we could do their job better than they do. The majority
has permitted the courts to encroach into an area reserved to the
78
executive branch by the Constitution.”
Justice Tomljanovich
disagreed with the lenient treatment of the defendant and would
have relied on the statute’s purpose of protecting minors and on
79
the lack of statutory authority for the district court’s action. Her
opinion emphasized her respect for legislative policy-making
powers and her disapproval of court overreaching. In her typically
straight-forward style, she stated, “I am at a loss to understand how
the court can put a person on probation and order jail time when
the court has not accepted a guilty plea and adjudged the person
80
guilty.”

75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
Justice Tomljanovich apparently did not find the defendant
particularly sympathetic, stating that
[t]he majority notes that the victim’s mother felt the court should ‘let it
end’ without prosecution. It is incredible that the victim’s mother has
given ‘her blessing’ to the relationship to preserve her good relationship
with her daughter. This law is designed to protect the minor victim from
her own immature judgment and that of her mother if necessary.
Id. at 260.
78. Id.
79. Id.; see also Mark H. Zitzewitz, Comment, State v. Krotzer: Inherent Judicial
Authority—Going Where No Court Has Gone Before, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1997)
(examining the holding of Krotzer and arguing that the Minnesota Court of
Appeals and the Minnesota Supreme Court erred in finding that inherent judicial
powers include the ability to stay adjudication of criminal prosecutions).
80. Krotzer, 548 N.W.2d at 260 (Tomljanovich, J., dissenting).
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III. CIVIL CASES
Justice Tomljanovich’s reverence for the home was apparent in
her civil opinions, as well as in her criminal opinions. In Wegner v.
81
Milwaukee Mutual Insurance Co., a police SWAT team used tear gas
and flash-bang grenades to apprehend an armed suspect, causing
82
Justice
over $70,000 in damages to Wegner’s home.
Tomljanovich, writing for a unanimous court, held “that where an
innocent third party’s property is damaged by the police in the
course of apprehending a suspect, that property is damaged within
83
the meaning of the constitution,” and the municipality must
84
“compensate the innocent party for the resulting damages.” In
Wegner, the court was presented with a number of complex
constitutional issues, including eminent domain, takings, and the
doctrine of public necessity. These analyses required the court to
weigh the responsibility of the police to protect the general public
against the harm to innocent parties. Justice Tomljanovich
concluded:
The policy considerations in this case center around the
basic notions of fairness and justice. At its most basic
level, the issue is whether it is fair to allocate the entire
risk of loss to an innocent homeowner for the good of the
public. We do not believe the imposition of such a
burden on the innocent citizens of this state would square
85
with the underlying principles of our system of justice.
Justice Tomljanovich, however, made it clear “that the individual
police officers, who were acting in the public interest, cannot be
held personally liable. Instead, the citizens of the City should all
86
bear the cost of the benefit conferred.”
81. 479 N.W.2d 38 (Minn. 1991).
82. Id. at 39.
83. Id. at 41-42.
84. Id. at 42.
85. Id.
86. Id. Justice Tomljanovich’s respect for law enforcement personnel was
apparent in a number of other cases. For example, in McDonnell v. Commissioner of
Public Safety, the court considered a Minnesota statute allowing police to require
drivers to submit to alcohol tests. 473 N.W.2d 848 (1991). This statute allowed
the suspect to consult with an attorney, but not until after submitting to testing.
Id. at 850 n.1. Justice Tomljanovich’s opinion conceded that there is no right to
counsel under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution until after
formal charges have been made. Id. at 853. It pointed out, however, that the
Minnesota Constitution provided a right to counsel at the time an individual is
asked to take a blood alcohol test. Id. The court had just adopted that
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87

In Miller v. Colortyme, Inc., Justice Tomljanovich, writing for a
unanimous court, determined that the anti-usury provisions of the
88
Consumer Credit Sales Act applied to rent-to-own transactions.
Her opinion observed that “[t]he purpose of the usury law is to
protect consumers by limiting the amount of interest which can be
89
charged on a credit sale or loan.”
The legislature’s decision to treat rent-to-own transactions
as credit sales recognizes that although these transactions
purport to be short-term leases, they operate in substance
much like ordinary installment sales. Consumers who
purchase goods through rent-to-own agreements may not
incur debt, but they still implicitly pay interest in return
for the ability to pay for goods over time. Moreover, rentto-own customers may not have an absolute obligation to
repay a principal amount, but their situation is analogous
to that of ordinary buyers on credit in that they must
either forfeit possession of a good or continue paying for
90
it.
Justice Tomljanovich noted that, under a number of the
transactions in question, the customers would have paid about
twice the stated cash prices by the time they actually owned the
91
purchased goods.
Justice Tomljanovich’s concurring opinion in Bilal v. Northwest

interpretation of the state constitution that same day in another case. Id. Justice
Tomljanovich mitigated the impact that this new rule would have on law
enforcement personnel:
Generally, decisions of this court overruling past decisions are given
retroactive effect. However, given the reasonable reliance of law
enforcement officials on prior decisions of this court . . . and given the
enormous burden on the administration of justice that would result from
giving Friedman completely retroactive effect, we limit the application of
Friedman to the three appeals now before this court, to any case in which
the Implied Consent Advisory has been challenged as a violation of the
right to counsel guaranteed by the Minnesota Constitution now pending
. . . and to any case arising after the date of Friedman’s release.
Id. (citation omitted). Her opinion also held that the Constitution does not allow
the police to threaten drivers refusing to submit to testing with potential criminal
penalties that could not be imposed on them, but it did allow use of a driver’s
refusal to submit to testing as evidence that the driver was intoxicated. Id. at 855.
87. 518 N.W.2d 544 (Minn. 1994).
88. Id. at 546.
89. Id. at 549.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 546.
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92

Airlines, Inc. evidences both her fondness for common sense and
her understanding of the important yet limited role of the
judiciary. In that case, the spouse of an airline employee, traveling
as a non-revenue passenger, was wearing sandals without stockings
93
in violation of the airline’s dress code. An airline employee, not
knowing that the passenger was Muslim, told her that she should
94
dress as if she were “going to church.” Justice Anderson, writing
for a unanimous court, held that the airline employee had not
intentionally engaged in religious discrimination, observing that
95
the employee had not even known that the passenger was Muslim.
Justice Tomljanovich concurred specially:
I concur with the result reached by the majority, but
write to express my concern that this matter ever reached
the courts. It is important to be sensitive to racial,
religious and gender differences and to avoid
discrimination. However, this lawsuit defies common
sense.
The majority pointed out that the word “church” does
not possess the inherent derogatory qualities of an
epithet. I agree. I believe that a chance remark such as
the one in this case that was not motivated by any
discriminatory intent should not be actionable just
because it includes the word “church.”
We must eliminate the use of language that diminishes
another person’s humanity, but this surely was not such
language. How much better it would have been when Ms.
Bilal was offended by Ms. Patrick’s reference to church if
she had sat down with Ms. Patrick and her supervisors and
explained her feelings.
An apology and a better
understanding of the situation would, no doubt, have
resulted. The courts simply cannot be the arbitrator of all
hurt feelings.
It is important that we communicate our feelings to
one another, but if we must live in fear that a lawsuit will
result each time we make a comment or use a word that
someone, somewhere, sometime might find offensive, all
human exchange of words and ideas will cease, and our

92.
93.
94.
95.

537 N.W.2d 614 (Minn. 1995).
Id. at 616.
Id.
Id. at 619.
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96

world will be a worse place in which to live.
97
Dziubak v. Mott also focused on the role of the judicial system,
requiring the court to balance the interests of criminal defendants
and the needs of the criminal justice system.
Justice
Tomljanovich’s majority opinion granted immunity to the public
defenders in Dziubak’s suit against his state public defenders for
98
malpractice. Although, like the dissenters, Justice Tomljanovich
was concerned about denying a remedy to indigent defendants, she
took a longer view, focusing on the practical effects of extending or
99
withholding immunity from public defenders. She distinguished
the relative positions of criminal defense lawyers in the public and
private sectors, observing that public defenders are required to
represent the clients assigned to them, regardless of the size and
100
difficulty of their caseloads.
She also recognized the lack of
101
resources available to the office of the public defender. “It would
be an unfair burden to subject the public defender to possible
malpractice for acts or omissions due to impossible caseloads and
an under-funded office: something completely out of the
102
defender’s control.”
Since justice demands that a defense be provided to
criminal defendants who are not able to afford privately
retained counsel, it is essential that a sufficient number of
qualified attorneys be willing and able to provide this
defense. Immunity will aid in the continued recruitment
of attorneys to perform this service in our criminal justice
system; such service is eagerly sought by most attorneys.
The accused defendant is not the sole beneficiary. Society
as a whole depends upon the role of defense counsel to
secure an ordered system of liberty and justice, as
ordained by our Constitution.
The extension of immunity to public defenders will
ensure that the resources available to the public defender
will be used for the defense of the accused, rather than
diminished through the defense of public defenders
against civil suits for malpractice. Immunity will conserve

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 620 (Tomljanovich, J., concurring).
503 N.W.2d 771 (Minn. 1993).
Id. at 773.
Id. at 776.
Id. at 775.
Id. at 776.
Id.
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these resources to provide an effective defense to the
103
greatest number of indigent defendants.
104
Nicollet Restoration, Inc. v. Turnham required the court to
consider the division of powers among the branches of
government. In that case, Justice Tomljanovich, writing for a
unanimous court, held that a corporation appearing in district
court had to be represented by a licensed attorney, even when the
105
matter arose in conciliation court. She reasoned that, despite the
fact that a Minnesota statute could be read to give corporations the
power to appear in court through non-attorney officers, such a
106
reading would violate the state constitution.
Since corporations are distinct legal entities, any
individual attempting to appear on behalf of the
corporation would, in effect, be practicing law. Based on
the legislature’s power to enact criminal statutes, it is clear
that the legislature has the authority to determine who
may or may not be prosecuted for the unauthorized
practice of law. This, however, does not mean that the
legislature may decide who may properly practice law
before the courts of this state. Under Article 3, Section 1
of the Minnesota Constitution, this power is vested solely
107
in the judiciary.
She discussed the policies underlying the attorney
requirement, pointing out that a “non-attorney agent of a
corporation is not subject to the ethical standards of the bar and is
not subject to court supervision or discipline. The agent knows but
108
one master, the corporation, and owes no duty to the courts.”
Moreover, she observed that, “[i]f district courts are to handle their
increasingly crowded and complex dockets efficiently and justly, it
is important that clients’ causes be presented by persons trained

103. Id. at 777-78.
104. 486 N.W.2d 753 (Minn. 1992).
105. Id. at 753.
106. Id. at 755.
107. Id. (citing Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Hous. & Redev. Auth., 310
Minn. 313, 318, 251 N.W.2d 620, 623 (1976)). Article III, section 1 of the
Minnesota Constitution provides: “The powers of government shall be divided into
three distinct departments: legislative, executive and judicial. No person or
persons belonging to or constituting one of these departments shall exercise any
of the powers properly belonging to either of the others except in the instances
expressly provided in this constitution.” Id. (citing MINN. CONST. art. III, § 1).
108. Id. at 754.
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109

and licensed to do so.”

IV. CONCLUSION
Some jurists believe that one should first determine what
justice requires and then use the law to achieve that result. In
contrast, because Justice Tomljanovich typically follows the law
rather than her own predilections, her decisions cannot
110
consistently be labeled either “liberal” or “conservative.”
Unable
to predict which side of a controversy Justice Tomljanovich will
take—state or criminal defendant, plaintiff or defendant—some
might criticize her jurisprudence as “inconsistent.” At a deeper
level of analysis, however, Justice Tomljanovich’s opinions are
consistent. They reflect an abiding belief in the power of the law to
achieve justice—a belief that, by following the dictates of the law,
justice generally will result. They demonstrate a belief in the
structural provisions of the United States and Minnesota
Constitutions. They show a respect for the separation of powers
between the federal and state governments and for the division of
powers among the governmental branches. They also evidence her
belief in both the desire and ability of people at the heart of the
government bodies to perform their roles with competence and
integrity.
Justice Tomljanovich’s judicial philosophy was consistent with
her approach to her work—it was not about her, her ego, or her
view of the law. She said that she found the greatest satisfaction not
from the ego satisfaction, nor from deciding big cases, but from the
opportunity to make a difference in someone’s life, to have a
positive influence at a critical juncture in that person’s life. “The
job is incredibly important, but you’re not. It’s real important that

109. Id. at 755.
110. Her official actions, as well as her opinions, demonstrated a lack of
partisanship. She was appointed to the Minnesota Supreme Court in 1990 by
Governor Rudy Perpich. ANNA CHERRY ET AL., 100 WHO MADE A DIFFERENCE 16
(2001). Although she was appointed by Governor Perpich, a Democrat, the
timing of her resignation permitted Governor Arnie Carlson, a Republican, to fill
the vacancy. Robert Whereatt, Tomljanovich to Retire From High Court; She Helped
Lead Way For Women on Bench, STAR TRIB., May 1, 1998, at 1B. Although her April,
1998 resignation did not become effective until August, 1998, it allowed Governor
Carlson to name her successor before filings for the office opened in July of 1998.
Id. This action kept the judicial post out of the election process, and her successor
did not have to run for re-election until 2000. Id.
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111

you have people who know that.”

111. CHRISTINE KRUEGER, THREE PATHS TO LEADERSHIP: A STUDY OF WOMEN ON
THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT 18 (1994) (statement of Justice Tomljanovich).
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